Most of the security problems in large and distributed information systems are vastly complex. Few research on detection of burgeoning Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, leads us to expand our perspectives to a comprehensive architectural approach in which particular issues like arrangement and communication of system components appear. In this paper, many useful ideas from the behaviour of biological immune systems are elicited based on the results of the latest immunological researches, especially Danger Theory. They are applied to create a model for immunization of distributed intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that are resistant to DDoS. Although a general model for various IDSs is proposed and implemented in this research, a particular simulation scenario for detecting DDoS in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is planned as an example to assess the general ability of the proposed model in detecting undesirable events.
INTRODUCTION
Reviewing the main characteristics of distributed systems and studying various mechanisms of human body, many interesting similarities between these two seemingly different fields can be realized. Natural immune system is a completely distributed system. It consists of a vast number of cells performing their tasks concurrently and interacting with each other in various ways including surface contact and chemical secretion. Interaction between the cells makes the system to have several complicated behaviors.
By now, many immune-inspired models have been proposed in the literature and researches are ongoing due to the encouraging results reported in the last years. The models are used in a number of applications: from misbehaviour and intrusion detection to optimization problems. The basic characteristics of artificial immune systems that can be supposed as major competitors to rival other techniques are parallelism, distribution and adaptiveness [1] , [2] . As far as confidentiality, integrity and availability of information are common goals of every security system [17] , the basic features of AISs are very advantageous and as far as they are advantageous, they can be found in every immune-inspired model. This paper presents a general security model by introducing a new architectural scheme. In order to develop such schemes, we need to embed security as we plan, design, and deploy the computers and communication networks that make up information infrastructures. In this research, a general purpose Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is implemented based on the proposed model. In addition to implementation details, simulation scenarios and results are presented.
II. MATERIAL AND METHODS

A. Related Works
During 1999 and 2000, Hofmeyr and Forrest proposed the first distributed AIS applicable to various computer security problems ( [13] , [14] ). The model is specialized to detect intrusions in local area networks. Generating detectors randomly through NSA, a second signal is used as costimulation to confirm the anomaly that was detected through NS procedure. A human is required to generate this signal manually in order to reduce false alarms of the system. Kim and Bentley [15] , assessed the similarities between network-based IDSs and human immune systems (HIS). The first multi-agent IDS based on AIS was proposed by Dasgupta in 1999 [16] and the work is continued by many others such as [12] and [8] . They all conclude that agent paradigm facilitates the construction of AIS especially when principles of software parallelism are considered to improve performance.
Greensmith et al. in [3] , [4] and [5] suggested a novel anomaly detection algorithm inspired by functionalities of Dendritic Cells (DCs). DCs are crucial cells in initiation of immune response from the viewpoint of danger theory. Authors abstracted DCs as signal processors that convert three input signals received by the cell to one output signal.
In 2005, Sarafijanovic and Boudec [6] , developed an AIS for detection of misbehaving nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks. Several routing protocol events in a discrete time interval are labelled and collected in a sequence to form the antigens. Mature detectors produced by NSA monitor the network traffic. Once a match is occurred, the detector goes into CSA and proliferates itself quickly. Danger signals are not used in this model; however, the authors recommended them to fortify the model. They suggested defining danger signals as network performance indicators such as packet loss and delay.
B. Intrusion Detection Systems and DDoS attacks
Intrusion detection is the process of dynamically monitoring events occurring in a computer system or network, analysing them for signs of possible incidents and often interdicting the unauthorized access [17] . In recent years, IDSs are changing gradually from host-based OSdependent systems to distributed systems that often run multiple operating systems [7] .
The first generation of distributed IDSs has client-server architecture while the second one presents a hierarchical architecture. In the latter one, data collected at leaf nodes are sent to intermediate nodes to be pruned and aggregated. The neat data are then conveyed to the higher levels to reach the server(s). In modern generation of IDSs, agents are used to collect data in various nodes and interact with each other in the network to make local and ubiquitous detections possible.
IDSs are often divided into two categories: misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection techniques examine both network and system activity for known instances of misuse using signature matching algorithms. This technique is effective at detecting attacks that are already known. However, novel attacks are often missed giving rise to false negatives. Anomaly detection systems rely on constructing a model of user behaviour that is considered "normal". The detection of novel attacks is more successful using the anomaly detection approach as any deviant behaviour is classified as an intrusion.
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an attack in which one or more machines target a victim and attempt to prevent the victim from doing useful work [18] . A Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack occurs when multiple systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system. This attack uses many computers to launch a coordinated DoS attack against one or more targets. DDoS attacks may occur in a variety of ways: flooding a network, disrupting inter-machine connections, disrupting services and blocking an individual from accessing one or more services [19] .
C. Brief Review of Natural Immune System
Natural Immune System (NIS) consists of molecules, cells and tissues that establish body's resistance to infection and inhibitory of decay agents in a complex fashion.
Lymphocytes are white blood cells that play major roles in the immune system. They consist of two groups of small cells called T-cells and B-cells that form the adaptive immunity, the highly specialized immunity of vertebrates. In contrast to adaptive immune system, innate immune system is inherited from invertebrates and is basic and nonspecific.
Dendritic Cells (DCs), macrophages and B cells are the three types of immune cells that can engulf unknown pathogens and break them down into small parts called antigens. Since these cells can bring up the analysed antigens to their surface in order to present them to other cells, they are known as Antigen-Presenting Cells (APCs).
Immune cells can communicate with each other in a couple of ways. They may have either direct surface contacts or indirect chemical secretion contacts. The former occurs when two cells collide and are capable of stimulating each other. In the latter way, a secreted chemical affects the cells in the near proximity of the generator, which have receptors sensitive to it.
D. Classical Immune Models
In 1958, Frank Burnet and Niels Jerne presented the Clonal Selection (CS) theory. If the receptors of a lymphocyte match with molecular patterns on the surface of an antigen, the lymphocyte are activated to proliferate itself rapidly giving rise to selection of certain type of lymphocyte that is specific to the invading antigen [9] . Based on CS theory, during the proliferation process, newly produced cells may hypermutate. This diversifies the agents in the shape space, which is subsequently followed by the selection process that is mainly a converging process. As a result, a fine adaptation of the cell to various instances of the attack that may exist in the environment is obtained.
In 1969, Peter Bretscher and Melvin Cohn discovered that B cells are only activated when an additional signal have been generated near the cell by an additional cell. This signal is called "help signal" and a newly found cell called "Helper T cell" or "TH" generates it.
In 1974, Kevin Lafferty and Allen Cunningham discovered that to generate helper signal, TH needs another signal, which comes from a newly found cell, later named Antigen Presenting Cells (APCs). They named the signal "Costimulation" because it is required in stimulating B cells.
E. The Danger Model
Next advancements of immunology raised a number of questions between immunologists, which the existing models could not answer them, e.g. "Why our bodies do not start any immune response against the foods we eat although they are actually foreign materials?" or "Why transplants are normally rejected but foetuses are not?", etc. [10] .
In 1994, the American immunologist, Polly Matzinger, presented a novel theory that explained many of the unanswered questions [11] . Based on her viewpoint, an immune response is the result of sensing danger besides strange antigenic patterns. The main difference of the model comparing to the SNSD model is that it does not accept nonself patterns as the only stimulant behind immune response. In addition, it suggests that the coincidence between foreign antigens and danger signals starts this process. In the absence of one of them, the immune system fails to ascertain that the stimulant is an invader and therefore does not start any offense against it.
Any sign of abnormal cell death that is released around a cell can be regarded as danger signal. By now, several perilous substances, mostly internal chemicals of body cells, are discovered to be so. Danger, costimulation and help signals are generated sequentially and upon lack of any, the next signal and consequently the immune response would not start.
III. THE PROPOSED MODEL
The proposed model is considered in two levels independent of any application bias. In the first level, the system is designed in a complete abstract manner and details are ignored as possible. Two primary types of security agents are defined in the model: A group of "stationary agents" those are analogous to the tissues of the body and a group of "mobile agents" that play the role of various immune cells. Each stationary agent consists of several mobile agents that can move to other stationary agents, too. Different network elements can settle tissue agents, such as hosts and servers. These agents are supposed to manage communications between the mobile agents they currently own and between themselves.
Cell agents perform their jobs autonomously and can exchange information to each other through asynchronous signal transduction. A slight difference between immunological signal transduction and common computational message passing is that immune signals propagate spatially local and they cannot affect faraway agents. Immune signals are also one-way meaning that the generator agent does not expect direct replies. Locality is effective especially in contrast to danger that generally provides a mechanism of sensing and aggregating required information in local and ubiquitous manner. Danger signals are unavoidable side effects of malicious behaviours. They are environmental symptoms that trigger complex local communications between nearby agents.
In the second level, agents are defined in details. There are four types of stationary agents analogous to biological equivalents: Thymus (TM), Bone Marrow (BM), Lymph Node (LN) and Local Tissue (LT). Each instance of stationary agents is deployed in a single host but more than one agent can be deployed in one host. This makes it possible to develop host-based IDSs based on this model.
Totally, three types of mobile agents are provided in the model: B Cell agent (BC), T Cell agent (TC) and APC agent. Each cell agent has a Molecular Pattern (MP) associated with it, which is generated randomly when it is first born at BM. TCs mature or die in TMs based on their MPs but BCs mature or die in the same BMs they are produced.
Analysing network status, BM produces required population of mobile agents and dispatches them to appropriate tissues existing in the network based on their types. BCs and TCs are evenly distributed among LNs waiting for incoming APCs to interact. BM dispatches APCs to various LTs, which are the danger-prone points of the system. APCs pick up (engulf) the first nonself pattern they encounter during lifetime. Searching for patterns of stress in close proximity, APCs keep counting the amounts of stress they detect in interaction with TCs. They only collect stress amounts from TCs that have high affinity to the engulfed pattern.
Mobile agents born at BMs are initially immature. TMs are the only tissues responsible for maturation of TCs. Like the natural case, BCs mature in BMs. LN is the place where activated APCs gather to satisfy resident TCs of activation. To improve performance and availability, LNs should be dispersed over the network evenly.
In order to maintain diversity and suppress undesirable deviations in population of mobile agents, they should have limited lifetimes. Therefore each agent has a monotonically increasing counter named "Lifespan" which is increased a specified amount in each time slice. The agent is forced to die through safe death process (apoptosis) when its lifespan reaches the maximum allowed value.
Dispatching mobile agents requires a mechanism to address the possible target stationary agents. Hence, a simple addressing method is provided with stationary agents in the model: Each agent notifies others by broadcasting an "Address Notification Message (ANM)" over the network when it first starts up. ANM consists of the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) address of the agent and its tissue type. URI includes address of the host the agent resides in, default addressing port number and internal object identifier of the agent. For example, in a TCP LAN, URIs have such a format: tcp://192.168.10.6:58534/6cfd8d96-7ef5-41f0-bedf-f611684689f3
All of stationary agents should be configured to use a special port number (here, port 58534) in all addressing communications. Each of them has an address table in which addresses of other stationary agents are saved. Receiving an ANM, agent looks for the incoming address in its address table. If it fails to find, it sends an ANM to the sender, otherwise it ignores the message.
APCs permanently generate costimulation signals after migration to lymph nodes. Based on discussed in [3] , dendritic cells that are the major APCs produce costimulation based on (1) . If σ S is safe concentration level, σ D the danger concentration level, σ P the density of affine molecular patterns, a i affinity of the detected pattern and W S , W D and W P weights concentration levels respectively, then σ C , the costimulation concentration level is calculated from (1) .
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The model is implemented as a multi-purpose intrusion detection system to be installed in a real environment or to be analyzed using datasets generated by various network simulators. As shown in Fig. 1 , the system is composed of seven main components that are analogous to the agents defined in the model. A component named Framework is also devised, which provides common functionalities and interfaces of other components and simplifies system deployment. MPs of the first section (N) are used for training TMs and BMs. These samples are then fed into the implemented IDS to be classified. In the simulation, one stationary agent of every type with 2000 APCs and 2000 TCs were used. Activation affinity threshold of all of the cells was set to 0.95. Table I shows the detection results in detail.
B. Applied Simulation 1) Network simulator and data sets generation:
The implemented system was tested against a group of network simulation results obtained from NS-2 simulator to detect misbehaving nodes in a wireless sensor network (WSN). NS-2, i.e. NS version two, is a popular and powerful Discrete Event Simulator (DES) that targets various network researches. NS outputs network event logs into human-readable trace files. Each line of these files has many fields carrying detailed information about an event that is generated by a node at a specific time. In addition, NS can be customized to log new fields within the trace lines. To simplify the process of converting NS trace files to dynamic event objects that can be used in our IDS, a tool named "Object-Trace Mapper (OTMapper)" was written.
2) Simulation topology: First, the AIS topology, i.e. number of agents and their types must be determined based on the simulated network topology. Here, we assign one LT for each sensor node. A new stationary agent called "Simulator Agent" or simply "SA" is designed to feed the system with mapped NS events. When it first boots up, it finds other stationary agents existing in the network using ANMs. Afterwards, it starts to send events to the corresponding LTs of the node that raised the event. SA keeps track of the time to dispatch events using the time field reported in trace lines.
3) Routing protocol and DDoS attack: The routing protocol used in simulation of WSN is Directed Diffusion, which is a data-centric algorithm. In this protocol, sink nodes request data by publishing "Interest" packet. Each intermediary node in the network has a cache in which stores interests of adjacent nodes. Data perceived by sensor nodes are directed to the requester nodes, or sinks, based on Interests that are saved in intermediary caches. A possible DDoS attack occurs when a misbehaving node floods the network with spurious interests resulting in overflow of intermediary caches and interest loss. This is a DDoS attack since the misbehaving node prevents intermediaries from replying to the lost interests. 4) Method of generating MPs and signals: NS events must be first converted to MPs and signals (safe or danger with their concentrations as confidence levels) that are perceptible to AIS. This is also done by SA dynamically. MPs are binary arrays of nucleotides grouped into genes each representing a feature that is extracted from an event. As the attack causes dramatic changes in send/receive rates, MPs are formed by two genes of "number of sends" and "number of receives" that are calculated in each time block. Since interface queue overflow eventually occurs as an unavoidable effect of the DDoS attack, it is a reasonable candidate for danger signal. Moreover, queue length is a relevant parameter for use as danger signal concentration that gradates immunity in response to the real amount of damage that is sustained by the system.
5) Generating train and test data:
The system requires some MPs as self patterns that are required in TMs and BMs for negative selection process. So the established network is simulated offline without any defect and misbehaviour to produce self events. Converting to proper MPs, they are then redirected to TMs and BMs. To provide test data, Directed Diffusion modules of NS are changed in order to produce misbehaving nodes. This is done by enforcing a node to publish feigned interest packets with normal distribution in random intervals. Building and running NS with impaired routing codes, it would be possible to obtain test trace files in order to feed the SA. SA converts the output events to meaningful MPs and signals and dispatches them during the system operation.
6) Parameter values and results: A WSN including 100 sensor nodes was established in NS with 50 subscribe nodes, 20 publish nodes and 30 relay nodes as network traffic. Among the subscribe nodes, 15 nodes were assumed to generate the attack by flooding interest packets. In AIS, one TM, one BM and one LN were created with 100 LT; one for each sensor node. 150 T H were trained and 500 APC were distributed among LTs evenly. Affinity thresholds of TCs and APCs were set 0.3 and 0.45 respectively. In TM, the TCs with affinities to self MPs higher than 0.7 were eliminated. Simulation results indicate that 9 out of 15 misbehaving nodes (60.0%) were detected correctly and 78 out of 85 healthy nodes (91.76%) were undetected correctly. So the false negative rate is 40.0% and the false positive rate is 8.23%.
VI. CONCLUSION
Data and tasks in large-scale distributed systems are often large so we need to break them into tolerable pieces and placing them on various nodes. Dynamic fragmentation and distribution of data and tasks over the network produces excessive overhead leading to reduction in performance and unavailability of data and tasks. This leads us to compromise between locality and distribution and maximize the locality to suppress intemperance in fragmentation. In the proposed architecture, despite of distributing IDSs components (the tasks) over the network, the gathered data is pre-processed locally and only the dominant results are then propagated to upper more-central agents.
The proposed model was fortified by danger theory, which fundamentally implies that natural immunization is not centric responses to pathogens but it is the result of distributed information gathered from various tissues located throughout the body. Components of the immune system interact with each other and invaders locally to provide protection in a completely distributed fashion. This worthy feature prohibits single points of failure in the system [10] .
Researches on IDSs are still going ahead as current instances have many problems: They are not accurate enough and cannot respond to real-time intrusions effectively. Most IDSs suffer from high false positive and false negative rates. They are not flexible enough to adapt to dynamic environments with different configurations and incompetencies. Most of them are weak against DDoS attacks, which are burgeoning attacks nowadays. In this paper, a new AIS model was proposed to overcome some of the previously unresolved problems in IDSs, which often appear in DoS attacks. Close resemblance to the natural analogue is an important benefit of the proposed model over its ancestors. It is enriched by mobile agents that have a basic role in resistance of system to DDoS attacks. The model was implemented and tested under rich simulation results obtained from NS simulator.
